Kyon

Kyon is a fictional character, protagonist and narrator of the Haruhi Suzumiya light novel series and the anime series The Melancholy of Haruhi Suzumiya, voiced by Tomokazu Sugita in the original version of the anime, and Crispin Freeman in the English dubbed edition. The name Kyon is also actually a nickname given to him by his aunt. His sister is responsible for spreading its use to his schoolmates, much to the embarrassment of Kyon, who misses being called Onii-chan by his sister. Not much is known about Kyon's real name. However, in the ninth volume of the light novel (The Dissociation of Haruhi Suzumiya), his real name is hinted in a conversation between him and Sasaki; a girl who had known Kyon since middle school, saying it was a very majestic name that didn't seem to fit him.

Kyon is one of Haruhi's companions, and the second founding member of the SOS Brigade. Upon his entry into high school, he resigns himself to a lifestyle where his adolescent fantasies such as aliens, time travelers, and espers have no place. After one small conversation with him, Haruhi unexpectedly opened up to him and dragged him into her new club. His reputation and fate have since become entangled with Haruhi's.

The History of Anatolia covers the civilizations, and states established in and around the Anatolia, a peninsula of Western Asia. It is also often called by the Latin name of Asia Minor.

Neolithic
Troy, Hittite Empire, Hayasa-Azzi, Colchians, Hattians, Kaskas
Through recorded history, Anatolians have spoken both Indo-European and Semitic languages, as well as many languages of uncertain affiliation. In fact, given the antiquity of the Indo-European Hittite and Luwian languages, some scholars have proposed Anatolia as the hypothetical center from which the Indo-European languages have radiated. Other authors have proposed an Anatolian origin for the Etruscans of ancient Italy.

Bronze Age
Neo-Hittite, Urartu, Achaemenid dynasty,
Peoples who have settled in or conquered Anatolia during the Iron Age include the Phrygians, Lydians, Mushki, Cimmerians, Armenians, Persians, Tabals, Greeks, Lycians, Ionians, Cappadocians, Assyrians, Carians, Sea Peoples, Phoenicians, Jews, Romans

Hellenism
Byzantine Empire, Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia, Sassanid Empire, Byzantine-Arab Wars, Seljuk Turks, Anatolian beyliks, Mongols, Ilkhanate

Middle Ages

Crusades

Ahlatshahs
Alaiye
Artuklu
Aydınoğlu
Candaroğlu
Çaka Bey
Çobanoğlu
Danishmend
Dulkadir
Eretna
Eşrefoğlu
Germiyan
Hamidoğlu
İnaloğlu
Kadı Burhaneddin
Karamanoğlu
Karesi
Beylik of Lâdik
Mengücek
Menteşe
Pervâneoğlu
Ramazanoğlu
Sâhib Ata
Saltuklu
Saruhan
Beylik of Teke Anatolian Beyliks
The conquest of Anatolia by Turkic peoples and the rise of the Seljuk Empire began in the 11th century.
Anatolia remained multi-ethnic until the early 20th century (see Rise of Nationalism under the Ottoman Empire). Its inhabitants were of varied ethnicities, including Turks (Turkmens), Armenians, Kurds, Greeks, and Italians (particularly from Genoa and Venice). When the First World War devastated Anatolia, ethnic tensions culminated in the 1915 Armenian Genocide.

Modern Turkey

Timeline of Middle Eastern History

About 2 dozen, see article
Buteoninae is a bird of prey subfamily which consists of medium to large broad-winged species.
They have large powerful hooked beaks for tearing flesh from their prey, strong legs and powerful talons. They also have extremely keen eyesight to enable them to spot potential prey from a distance.
This subfamily contains the buzzards, true eagles and sea eagles.

Terminology
Historians often comment on mob rule as a factor in the rise of Rome and its maintenance, as the city of Rome itself was large − between 100,000 and 250,000 citizens − while the aristocracy and even military was very small by comparison to the citizenry. With weapons also being crude, the military force did not exist that could have dealt with a revolt from the larger populace. There was a constant need to keep people fed, distracted, and in awe of the power of the state. Those who could do this, ruled not only Rome, but the whole of the Roman Empire.
Lapses in this control often led to loss of power, or even the loss of heads, of officials − most notably in the reign of Commodus when Cleander unwisely used the Praetorian Guard against a mob which had come to call for his head. As Edward Gibbon relates it,
The people... demanded with angry clamors the head of the public enemy. Cleander, who commanded the Praetorian Guards, ordered a body of cavalry to sally forth and disperse the seditious multitude. The multitude fled with precipitation towards the city; several were slain, and many more were trampled to death; but when the cavalry entered the streets their pursuit was checked by a shower of stones and darts from the roofs and windows of the houses. The foot guards, who had long been jealous of the prerogatives and insolence of the Praetorian cavalry, embraced the party of the people. The tumult became a regular engagement and threatened a general massacre. The Praetorians at length gave way, oppressed with numbers; and the tide of popular fury returned with redoubled violence against the gates of the palace, where Commodus lay dissolved in luxury and alone unconscious of the civil war... Commodus started from his dream of pleasure and commanded that the head of Cleander should be thrown out to the people. The desired spectacle instantly appeased the tumult...
This followed a previous incident in which the legions of Britain had demanded and received the death of Perennis, the prior administrator. The mob thus realized that it had every chance of success.

Mobs in history
During the French Revolution, the mobs in Paris played a similar function, but were more carefully manipulated by political leaders who sensed that they had the power to dispose of monarchy entirely, as they did, eventually setting up a representative democracy (which in turn fell to Napoleon's model of semi-constitutional monarchy).
The modern theories of civil disobedience and satyagraha bear some resemblance to mob rule and its mechanics. Certainly it is quite frightening for large numbers of people, even peaceful ones, to be marching and shouting common demands, if one is charged with the uncomfortable task of refusing them. If Roman guards, facing crucifixion for disobedience, could be swayed by mobs, it is obviously possible also to sway modern police even in a police state. The 1986 EDSA Revolution in the Philippines, the Velvet Revolution in former Czechoslovakia, and the resistance to the military coup in the Soviet Union in 1991 that led to the collapse of that state, are situations where it is possible that it was the "mob" which won the day due to defections by authority.
Whether by intent or by circumstance, non-violent well-organized assemblies often degrade into unruly mobs. Provocation from within (such as an agent provocateur) and from external forces is often a factor, but crowd dynamics often spontaneously emerge to confront the peaceful intentions of those who rallied a crowd. Published treatises on civil disobedience theory almost always encourage practitioners to establish order within their ranks, but civil disobedience groups often face difficulty in controlling those they recruit. Dr. Martin Luther King, a renowned advocate of orderly demonstrations of group power, died after he returned to Memphis to restore order to demonstrations he had inspired but which had turned violent on his previous visit.

Mobs used to affect policy
A scenario where mob pressure did not win can be seen in the incidents of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. While Beijing-based units of the People's Liberation Army initially refused to charge on the students occupying the square, new units from the countryside were brought in, who tended to perceive the students not as citizens like themselves, but as people deluded by a privileged position in Chinese society. As soldiers fought their way through barricades and through a downtown area occupied by a now-leaderless throng, combat injuries and injuries from indirect gunfire in an urban setting resulted in deaths. The dead and injured included Beijing residents, PLA soldiers and students who had left the square to enforce barricades around the city.
As this example shows, relying on sheer mob strength and disruption is chancy in any political movement, and may not to be relied upon for any extended period. Encounters with mob rule usually hinge on threats of bodily harm - do what the mob wants, and you won't get hurt; resist, and you almost certainly will - the sheer size and psychological makeup of the mob makes it difficult or impossible to assign blame to any one person. The morality of the mob and its actions can be said to depend on what its demands are, what it's being influenced by, and what it's fighting against. While most people would find it objectionable for a mob to cause harm to ordinary citizens, the same cannot be said about a mob rising up to depose a tyrant; unfortunately these distinctions can be lost in the passions of the throng.

Other mobs

Bandwagon effect
Collective consciousness
Collective effervescence
Collective hysteria
Collective intelligence
Crowd
Crowd psychology
Flash mob
Group (sociology)
Group behaviour
Herd behaviour
Herd instinct
Herd morality (Friedrich Nietzsche)
Keeping up with the Joneses
Lynching
Peer pressure
Sheeple
Smart mob
Social comparison theory
Spiral of silence
Tribalism

The Guyana cricket team is the representative first class cricket team of Guyana.
It does not take part in any international competitions, but rather in inter-regional competitions in the Caribbean, such as the Carib Beer Cup and the KFC Cup, and the best players may be selected for the West Indies team, who plays international cricket.
Guyana has won the domestic first class title five times since its inception in 1965-66, which is the third highest amount of wins, behind Barbados and Jamaica. In the 2005-06 Carib Beer Cup, Guyana finished third after going unbeaten through the season, though they only won one of the five games.
In one-day cricket, Guyana has reached the final of the domestic competition four of the last five times, and are the current holders of the KFC Cup. They have won the KFC Cup a total of nine times - including two shared titles - which is the most by any competing team, Trinidad and Tobago coming closest with seven (including one shared).
The cricket team has been known under two other names - they were first known as Demerara when they played in the first first-class cricket game of the West Indies, against Barbados in 1865, and they retained that name until 1899, when it was finally changed to British Guiana (they had also played first-class cricket in 1895 as British Guiana). The name of British Guiana stuck until 1965-66, when the nation and thus the team changed to its current name. From 1971 until the mid 1980s two regional sides competed in an annual first class match for the Guystac Trophy.
The list of prominent cricketers who have played for Guyana includes Basil Butcher, Shivnarine Chanderpaul, Colin Croft, Roy Fredericks, Lance Gibbs, Roger Harper, Carl Hooper, Alvin Kallicharran, Rohan Kanhai, Clive Lloyd and Ramnaresh Sarwan.

2005-06 squad

Domestic first-class competition winners: 1972-73, 1974-75, 1982-83, 1986-87, 1992-93, 1997-98 (shared)
Inter-Colonial Tournament (between Barbados, British Guiana and Trinidad only) winners: 1895-96, 1929-30, 1934-35, 1935-36, 1937-38
Unofficial regional tournaments (post-World War II): 1956-57 (shared), 1961-62, 1963-64.
Domestic one-day competition winners: 1979-80, 1982-83, 1984-85, 1992-93 (shared), 1995-96 (shared), 1998-99, 2001-02, 2003-04, 2005-06
Inaugural winners of the Stanford Twenty20 tournament: 2005-06

Populism is a political doctrine or philosophy that purports to defend the interests of the common people against an entrenched, self-serving or corrupt elite. There has often been dispute over definitions of populism, with some even arguing that the term is too vague to be useful. Recently, in their volume Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell define populism as "an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous 'others' who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice" (Palgrave MacMillan, 2007).
Recent scholarship has also discussed populism as a rhetorical style; as such, the term "populist" may be applied to proponents of widely varying political philosophies. Leaders of populist movements in recent decades have claimed to be on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, while some populists claim to be neither "left wing," "centrist" nor "right wing." Often they employ dichotomous rhetoric, and claim to represent the majority of the people. Many populists appeal to a specific region of a country or to a specific social class, such as the working class, middle class, or farmers or simply "the poor".

Populist methods

History
The word populism is derived from the Latin word populus, which means people in English (in the sense of "nation," as in: "The Roman People" (populus Romanus), not in the sense of "multiple individual persons" as in: "There are people visiting us today"). Therefore, populism espouses government by the people as a whole (that is to say, the masses). This is in contrast to elitism, aristocracy, or plutocracy, each of which is an ideology that espouse government by a small, privileged group above the masses.
Populism has been a common political phenomenon throughout history. Spartacus could be considered a famous example of a populist leader of ancient times through his slave rebellion against the rulers of Ancient Rome. In fact, such leaders of the Roman Republic as Gaius Marius, Julius Caesar, and Caesar Augustus were called populares, as all used referendums to go over the Roman Senate's head and establish the laws that they saw fit.

Classical populism
The same conditions which contributed to the outbreak of the English Revolution of 1642-1651, also known as the English Civil War, also led to a proliferation of ideologies and political movements among peasants, self-employed artisans, and working class people in England. Many, possibly most, of these groups had a dogmatic Protestant religious bent. They included Puritans and the Levellers.

Early modern period
Romanticism, the anxiety against rationalism, broadened after the beginnings of the European and Industrial Revolutions because of cultural, social, and political insecurity. Romanticism led directly into a strong popular desire to bring about religious revival, nationalism and populism. The ensuing religious revival eventually blended into political populism and nationalism, becoming at times a single entity, and a powerful force of public will for change. The paradigm shift brought about was marked by people looking for security and community because of a strong emotional need to escape from anxiety and to believe in something larger than themselves.
The revival of religiosity all over Europe played an important role in bringing people to populism and nationalism.
All of these were united by a search for something to believe in, divine certainties in an increasingly uncertain age.

In France, Chateaubriand provided the opening shots of Catholic revivalism as he opposed enlightenment's materialism with the "mystery of life," the human need for redemption.
In Germany, Schleiermacher promoted pietism by stating that religion was not the institution, but a mystical piety and sentiment with Christ as the mediating figure raising the human consciousness above the mundane to God's level.
In England, John Wesley's Methodism split with the Anglican church because of its emphasis on the salvation of the masses as a key to moral reform, which Wesley saw as the answer to the social problems of the day. Religious revival
Chateaubriand's beginning brought about two Catholic Revivals in France: first, a conservative revival led by Joseph de Maistre, which defended ultramontanism, also known as the supremacy of the Pope in the church, and a second populist revival led by Felicite de Lamennais, an excommunicated priest. This religious populism opposed ultramontanism and emphasized a church community dependent upon all of the people, not just the elite. Furthermore, it stressed that church authority should come from the bottom-up and that the church should alleviate suffering, not merely accept it, both principles that gave the masses strength.

Rejection of ultramontanism
Nationalism turned in the second half of the 19th century and the nationalist sentiment was altered into an elitist and conservative doctrine.
Power-state theorist and multi-volume historian Heinrich von Treitschke's Politics talked about top-down nationalism in which the state is the creator of the nation, not a result thereof. His state's power fashions political unity because, as he asserts, the national unity was always in place. For von Treitschke, the state is artificially constructed by the elite who know that power counts, but who also form myths such as racism for the comfort and control of the nationalistic masses.
Von Treitschke's nationalism had a dark side. The eternal struggle of nations exposed the weakness of confederated states, via war as social hygiene, culminating in the thought that all nations are egoistic, but their struggles embody morality and embrace progress. Such notions would later be proliferated in the tenets of National Socialism, with strong "races" and states dutifully conquering, and even exterminating, the weak.

Populism in Latin America
Populism in Latin America has been traced by some to concepts taken from Perón's Third Position. Populist practitioners in Latin America usually adapt politically to the prevailing mood of the nation, moving within the ideological spectrum from left to right many times during their political lives. Latin American countries have not always had a clear and consistent political ideology under populism. Most of these countries cannot be as clearly and easily divided between liberals and conservatives, as in the USA, or between social-democrats and Christian-democrats as in European countries. Nevertheless, the more recent pattern that has emerged in Latin American populists has been decidedly socialist populism that appeals to masses of poor by promising redistributive policies and state control of the nation's energy companies.
Populism has been fiscally supported in Latin America during periods of growth such as the 1950s and 1960's and during commodity price booms such as in oil and precious metals. Political leaders could gather followers among the popular classes with broad redistributative programs during these boom times. Populism in Latin America has been sometimes criticized for the fiscal policies of many of its leaders, but has also been defended for having allowed historically weak states to buy off disorder and achieve a tolerable degree of stability while initiating large-scale industrialization. Thus though specific populist fiscal and monetary policies may be criticized by economic historians, populism has also allowed leaders and parties to co-opt the radical ideas of the masses so as to redirect them in a non revolutionary direction.
Often adapting a nationalist vocabulary and rhetorically convincing, populism was used to appeal to broad masses while remaining ideologically ambivalent. Notwithstanding, there have been notable exceptions. 21st Centur Latin-American populist leaders have had a decidedly socialist bent.
When populists do take strong positions on economic philosophies such as capitalism versus socialism, the position sparks strong emotional responses regarding how best to manage the nation's current and future social and economic position. Mexico's 2006 Presidential election was hotly debated within Mexicans who supported and opposed populist candidate Andre Manuel Lopez Obrador.

History
Thus populism in Latin American countries has both an economic and an idelogical edge. The situation is similar in many countries with the legacies of poor and low-growth economies: highly unequal societies in which people are divided between a relative few wealthy families and masses of poor (with some exceptions such as Argentina, where strong and educated middle classes are a significant segment of the population).
Other perspectives trace inequality to the formation of Latin America's governments and institutions, which were shaped by the Spanish crown upon the conquest of the Americas by the Spaniards. Latin America was not meant to be a colony for the settlers to live in and develop, like the United States, but a source of resources for the Spanish crown. After the nations obtained their Independence, many colonial legacies survived.
Populist can be very successful political candidates in such countries. In appealing to the masses of poor people prior to gaining power, populists may promise widely-demanded food, housing, employment, basic social services, and income-redistribution. Once in political power, they may not always be financially or politically able to fulfill all these broad promises. However, they are very often successful in stretching to provide many broad and basic services.

Inequality
In Mexico, Brazil and Argentina in a relatively short period of time, populist leaders were perceived to have delivered more to their lower class constituents than previous governments. Critics of populist policies point to the infamous consequences of spending and lack of reform on these countries' respective finances involving growing debt, pressured currencies, and hyperinflation, which in turn led to high interest rates, low growth, and debt crisis. The 1980s in Latin America became referred to as a lost decade during which the region experienced low economic growth and few if any reductions in poverty while the Asian Tigers have been consitently developing through high rates of savings, investments, and educational achievements. Supporters of past economic policies would point to the uncontrollable economic consequences of high oil prices to much of the world economy during the 1970s and the unanticipated fall in commodity prices that would later complicate financing past spending.
Reacting to the legacy of the debt-crisis and slow growth during the 1980s, many Latin American governments privatized state-owned enterprises, such as electricity and telecommunications during the wave of privatizations that occurred in those countries in the 1990s, and opened to trade. This has also been done outside Latin American from the US and England (during the Thatcher / Reagan years) to Russia and China's (accelerating economic liberalization during the 90's) to speed economic growth and employment.
Populists with socialist bents maintain clear support in many cases.
In the Argentinian Corralito crisis, the government was forced to withdraw after three days of popular riots. In Mexico, tortilla price increases have sparked protests demanding price-controls which the leadership instead handled with a gentleman's agreement with major manufacturers capping prices for a fixed time period.
The economic debate continues as reforms to weak and closed Latin American economies opened up to external shocks and competition such as through privatizations and NAFTA in Mexico and other trade agreements and privatizations throughout Latin America. While orthodox economics point to longer term gains for quickly modernizing countries like Chile, slower moving countries have considered retracting from the initial shocks. Some blame a "neo-liberal" economic model favored by an unpopular US government. The "neo-liberal" name, along with the "Washington consensus" have been used to criticize harsh economic policies on the one hand, and on the other hand some have used to demonize modern economic science and policies by tying them directly to the unpopular US government which faces widespread distrust in Latin America. Indeed throughout the world, economists generally agree that the older socialist policies favored by many populists have hindered Latin American economies and that today further economic reforms would be needed to compete in the international arena for more jobs and faster growth. Support for socialism continues within economic circles that rely on pro-socialist works such as "Whither Socialism" by Stiglitz.

The Economics Debate on Populism and Socialist Populism
US international policies have intervened in Latin American governments in many occasions where populism has threatened its interests: the interventions in Guatemala, when the popular Arbenz government was overthrown by a coup backed by the American company United Fruit and the American ambassador in 1954, and Pinochet's Chilean coup in 1973 are just two cases of American intervention responding to American interests. Daniel Ortega's Sadinista government in Nicaragua was also viewed as a threat to US foreign policy during the Cold War, leading the United States to place an emgargo on trade with the Sadinista's Communist regime as well as support anti-Sadinista rebels.

US Policy
Populism has nevertheless remained a significant force in Latin America. Populism has recently been re-appearing on the far left with promises of far-reaching socialist changes as seen in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. These socialist changes have included policies nationalizing energy companies such as oil, and consolidation of power into the hands of the President so as to enable a socialist "transformation." The Venezuelan government often spars verbally with the United States and accuses it of attempting to overthrow its president Hugo Chavez after supporting a failed coup against him. Hugo Chavez himself has been one of the most outspoken and blunt critics of US foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Venezuelan and US governments continue to rely on each other for oil sales from Venezuela to the US.
In the 21st Century, the large numbers of voters in extreme poverty in Latin America have remained a bastion of support for new populist candidates. Populist candidates have been defeated in middle-income countries such as Peru and Mexico, in part by comparing them to Venezuela's controversial Hugo Chavez, who's socialist policies have been used to scare the growing middle classes and who verbally criticed and belittled the popular Mexican president Vicente Fox. Nevertheless, populist candidates have been more successful in poorer Latin American countries such as Bolivia (under Morales), Ecuador (under Correa), and Nicaragua (under Ortega).
Wherever governments in Latin America maintain high rates of poverty and yet support unpopular privatizations and more orthodox economic policies without quickly delivering gains to enough people, they will continue to come under pressure from populist politicians who accuse them of focusing on securing more benefits for the upper and upper-middle classes rather than the people as represented by those in poverty and extreme poverty, and for being allied to foreign and business interests.

Populist Strength and Current Socialist Tendency
In Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's candidacy sparked very emotional debates throughout the country regarding policies that affect ideology, class, equality, wealth, and society. Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's most controversial economic policies included his promise to expand monthly stipends to the poor and elderly from Mexico City to the rest of the country and to re-negotiate NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) to protect the Mexican poor. The ruling party in Mexico, known as the PAN (Spanish acronym for the National Action Party) portrayed him as a danger to Mexico's hard-earned economic stability. In criticizing his redistributive promises that would create new entitlement programs somewhat similar to social security in the US (though not as broad in scope) and his trade policies that would not fully uphold prior agreements (such as NAFTA), the economic debate between capitalists and socialists became a major part of the debate. The PAN candidate portrayed himself as not just a standard-bearer for recent economic policy, but rather more fully as a more pro-active candidate so as to distance himself from the main criticisms of his predecessor Vicente Fox regarding inaction. He labeled himself the "jobs president" and promised greater national wealth for all through steady future growth, fiscal prudence, international trade, and balanced government spending. During the immediate aftermath of the tight elections in which the country's electoral court was hearing challenges to the vote tally that had Calderon winning, Obrador showed the considerable influence over the masses that are a trademark of populist politicians. He effectively led huge demonstrations filling the central plaza with masses of sympathizers who supported his challenge. The demonstrations lasted for several months and eventually dissipated after the electoral court did not find sufficient cause from the challenges presented to overturn the results.

Mexico: A case study of populism in political campaigns
The Narodnichestvo movement in Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century could be described as a populist movement.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky in modern Russia is another good example of populist politician.
Natalia Vitrenko of Ukraine is also sometimes characterised as left-wing populist politician. Populism in Russia and the former Soviet Union
The United States saw the formation of such political parties during the late 19th and early 20th centuries as the Populist Party, the Greenback Party, the Single Tax movement of Henry George, the Progressive Party of 1912 led by Theodore Roosevelt, the Progressive Party of 1924 led by Robert M. La Follette, Sr., and the Share Our Wealth movement of Huey Long in 1933-35. Some left-wing populist parties advocated socialism, while other populists rejected both socialism and capitalism, notably Huey Long and Father Charles Coughlin.
George Wallace of Alabama led a populist movement that carried five states and won 13.5% of the popular vote in the 1968 presidential election. Campaigning against intellectuals and liberal reformers, Wallace gained a large share of the white working class vote in Democratic primaries in 1972.
Populism continues to be a force in modern US politics, especially in the 1992 and 1996 third-party presidential campaigns of billionaire Ross Perot. The 1996, 2000 and the 2004 presidential campaigns of Ralph Nader had a strong populist cast. The 2004 campaigns of Dennis Kucinich and Al Sharpton also had populist elements.
Comparison between earlier surges of Populism and those of today are complicated by shifts in what are thought to be the interests of the common people. Jonah Goldberg and others argue that in modern society, fractured as it is into myriad interest groups and microgroups, any attempt to define the interests of the "average person" will be so general as to be useless.
Over time, there have been several versions of a Populist Party in the United States, inspired by the People's Party of the 1890s. This was the party of the early U.S. populist movement in which millions of farmers and other working people successfully challenged much of the social ills engendered by the "Gilded Age" monopolists.
In 1984, the Populist Party name was revived by Willis Carto, and was used in 1988 as a vehicle for the presidential campaign of former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke. Right-wing Patriot movement organizer Bo Gritz was briefly Duke's running mate. This incarnation was widely regarded as a vehicle for white supremacist recruitment.
In 1995, the Reform Party was organized after the populist presidential campaign of Ross Perot in 1992. After a disputed takeover of the party in 2000, Patrick J. Buchanan received the party's nomination for president.
In the 2000s, many smaller populist parties were formed in America, including the Populist Party of Maryland, which ran candidates for governor, lt. governor and state delegate in the 2006 elections, Populist Party of America in 2002, and the American Populist Renaissance in 2005. The American Moderation Party, also formed in 2005, adopted several populist ideals, chief among them working against multinational neo-corporatism. Within the American media, CNN's Lou Dobbs and Fox News' Bill O'Reilly espouse themselves as voices of populism.
Senator Jim Webb (D-Va.) was elected in 2006 over incumbent George Allen. Webb held prominent offices in the Republican party during the 1980s, but became a Democrat in part because in his opinion, as he stated in a January 2007 NPR interview, the Democratic party seemed more aligned to his populist beliefs. This illustrates that populism can and does span the American political spectrum.

Populism in the United States of America
See: Völkisch movement

Fichte began the development of nationalism by stating that people have the ethical duty to further their nation.
Herder proposed an organic nationalism that was a romantic vision of individual communities rejecting the Industrial Revolution's model communities, in which people acquired their meaning from the nation. This is a philosophy reminiscent of subsidiarity.
The Brothers Grimm collected German folklore to "gather the Teutonic spirit" and show that these tales provide the common values necessary for the historical survival of a nation.
Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, a Lutheran Minister, a professor at the University of Berlin and the "father of gymnastics," introduced the Volkstum, a racial nation that draws on the essence of a people that was lost in the Industrial Revolution.
Adam Mueller went a step further by positing the state as a bigger totality than the government institution. This paternalistic vision of aristocracy concerned with social orders had a dark side in that the opposite force of modernity was represented by the Jews, who were said to be eating away at the state.
Adolf Hitler, leader of Nazi Germany, was installed in the exceptional office of Führer. However, Hitler's policies were not populist. Populism in Germany
In France, the populist and nationalist picture was more mystical and metaphysical in nature.

Historian Jules Michelet fused nationalism and populism by positing the people as a mystical unity who are the driving force of history in which the divinity finds its purpose. For Michelet, in history, that representation of the struggle between spirit and matter, France has a special place because the French became a people through equality, liberty, and fraternity. Because of this, he believed, the French people can never be wrong. Michelet's ideas are not socialism or rational politics, and his populism always minimizes, or even masks, social class differences.
In the late 18th century, the French Revolution, though led by wealthy intellectuals, could also be described as a manifestation of populist sentiment against the elitist excesses and privileges of the Ancien Régime.
Jean Marie Le Pen can be characterised as right-wing populist. Populism in France
This entry is related to, but not included in the Political ideologies series or one of its sub-series. Other related articles can be found at the Politics Portal.

Black populism
Bolivarian Revolution
Communitarianism A partially related political philosophy
Charismatic authority
Christian Democracy
Christian Socialism
Christian right
Conservatism
Cultural production and nationalism
Demagogy — as an abstract kind of untruthful speech
Fascism
Far right
Giuseppe Garibaldi
Giuseppe Mazzini
Gaullism
Jacobin (politics)
José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia
Kemalist ideology (Kemalism)
Mahatma Gandhi
Marxism
Nationalism
Nazism
Nehru
Neo-populism
People's Party
Poujadism
Producerism
Sarkozy
Social Democracy
Socialism
Thatcherism
Union Organizer See also

Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico
The Return of Populism
Populist Party of America
Right-Wing populist resources
Left-Wing populist resources
Midwest Populist Party
Study of populism that discusses Canovan
The Populist Blog, A Blog written by a Progressive Populist from Detroit, Michigan Footnotes

General

Fritzsche, Peter. 1990. Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505780-5
Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe, New York: St. Martins Press. ISBN 0-312-08390-4, ISBN 0-312-12195-4

Najm ad-Din Ilghazi ibn Artuq (died November 8, 1122) was the Turkish Artukid ruler of Mardin from 1107 to 1122.
His father Artuk was the founder of the Artukid dynasty, and had been appointed governor of Jerusalem by the Seljuk emir Tutush. When Artuk died, Ilghazi and his brother Sökmen succeeded him as governors of Jerusalem. In 1096 Ilghazi allied with Duqaq of Damascus and Yaghi-Siyan of Antioch against Radwan of Aleppo; Duqaq and Radwan were fighting for control of Syria after the death of Tutush. Ilghazi and Dukak eventually quarrelled and Ilghazi was imprisoned, leading to the capture of Jerusalem by his brother Sökmen, but Ilgazi recovered the city when he was released. He held it until the city was captured by the Fatimid vizier of Egypt, al-Afdal Shahanshah, in 1098. After this he sought to make a name for himself in the Jezirah, where his brothers had also established themselves. He then entered the service of the Seljuk sultan Mahmud I, who granted him Hulwan and made him shihna of Baghdad, an office which oversaw the affairs of the caliph on behalf of the sultan.
Ilgazi was dismissed as shihna in 1104 and became leader of the Artukid family after the death of Sökmen that year. This was disputed by Sökmen's son Ibrahim, but Ilghazi took Mardin from him in 1108. As head of the Artukids he made no lasting alliances and frequently switched sides, allying with both fellow Muslims and Christian crusaders whenever he saw fit. In 1110 he participated in an unsuccessful siege of Edessa. In 1114 he and his nephew Balak (future emir of Aleppo) defeated the Seljuk governor of Mosul, Aksungur al-Bursuki, and captured Mas'ud, son of the Seljuk sultan. In 1115 Ilghazi besieged Hims, but was captured briefly by its governor Khir-Khan. Later that year, Roger of Antioch, Baldwin I of Jerusalem, Pons of Tripoli, and Baldwin II of Edessa defended Antioch against the Seljuk general Bursuk (not to be confused with al-Bursuki), with the aid of Ilghazi, Toghtekin of Damascus, and Lulu of Aleppo, all enemies of Bursuk. These two armies did not come to battle, although Bursuk was later defeated by Roger at the Battle of Tell Danith.
Ilghazi gained control of Aleppo after the assassination of Lulu in 1117. In 1118 he took control of Mayyafiriqin and pacified the surrounding countryside. In 1119 Ilghazi defeated and killed Roger at the Battle of Ager Sanguinis; Ibn al-Qalanisi describes the victory as "one of the finest of victories, and such plenitude of divine aid was never granted to Islam in all its past ages." However, Baldwin II (now Baldwin II of Jerusalem) soon arrived to drive Ilghazi back, inflicting heavy losses on the Turks. The next year Ilghazi took Nisibin, and then pillaged the County of Edessa before turning north towards Armenia. In 1121 he made peace with the crusaders, and with supposedly 150 000 troops, including men led by his son-in-law Sadaqah and Sultan Malik of Ganja, he invaded Georgia. David IV of Georgia met him at the Battle of Didgori and Ilgazi was defeated. According to Matthew of Edessa 400 000 Turks were killed, though there were not even that many at the battle. Among the various leaders, only Ilghazi and his son-in-law Dubais escaped.
In 1122 Ilghazi and Balak defeated Joscelin I of Edessa and took him prisoner, but Ilgazi died in November of that year at Diyarbekir. He was buried at Mayyafariqin (Silvan today). Balak succeeded him in Aleppo and his sons Sulaiman and Timurtash succeeded him in Mardin.
Ibn al-Qalanisi is generally neutral on the character of Ilghazi, and describes only one "disgraceful habit" of the emir: "Now when Ilghazi drank wine and it got the better of him, he habitually remained for several days in a state of intoxication, without recovering his senses sufficiently to take control or to be consulted on any matter or decision." The Antiochene chronicler Walter the Chancellor was at first also neutral towards Ilghazi, until the Battle of Ager Sanguinis, in which Walter himself was captured; Ilghazi (written as "Algazi" in Latin) is then described as a "tyrant" and the "prince of the delusion and dissent of the Turcomans." Walter also remarks on Ilghazi's drunkenness.
Ilghazi married first Farkhunda Khatun, the daughter of Radwan of Aleppo, but he never actually met her and the marriage was never consummated. He then married the daughter of Toghtekin of Damascus and had the following children:
He also had a son, Umar, by a concubine, and Nasr, by a slave; another possible son was named Kirzil.

Ayaz
Guhar Khatun, married Dubais
al-Bazm
Shams ad-Daula Sulaiman
Safra Khatun, married Husam ad-Din Qurti ibn Toghlan Arslan
Yumna Khatun, married Sa'd ad-Daula Il-aldi of Amid
al-Sa'id Husam ad-Din Timurtash See also

Artukid dynasty